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This article examines an initiative by the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government to increase 
the income opportunities emerging from the school feeding programme. Since the inception 
of the programme, small medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) had been enlisted to 
provide schools with ingredients. However in 2006, the KwaZulu-Natal provincial 
government replaced some SMMEs with women’s cooperatives. By 2009, 12 of the original 
42 cooperatives had collapsed, and some schools being serviced by these cooperatives 
complained of unreliable delivery of ingredients. This article examines the interface between 
policy and implementation through a case study of four cooperatives in one district. Our data 
suggests that some cooperatives struggled to take root as a result of a variety of factors 
which we discuss under the themes of viability, membership and skills. The top down creation 
of these cooperatives according to inflexible guidelines also resulted in significant problems.  
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In 2006, the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government introduced a measure intended to 
increase the income opportunities created by the state funded School nutrition programme. 
Some of the small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) that had been supplying schools 
with ingredients were replaced by newly created cooperatives. This article reports on a 
qualitative investigation into the effects of this policy according to some of the actors 
involved with school feeding at provincial and district levels. 
 
We address five questions, each one corresponding to subsequent sections of the article. First, 
what are the intended outcomes of school feeding schemes both in general and in South 
Africa, and what assessments have been offered on the South African programme? Second, 
why do some policy makers favour cooperatives and what cautions are offered in the 
literature regarding their implementation? Third, how did cooperatives come to feature in the 
KwaZulu-Natal school nutrition programme and what resulted from the implementation of 
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this policy? Fourth, what difficulties were experienced during, or resulting from, the attempt 
to establish cooperatives? Fifth, how might these findings inform a different approach to 
establishing cooperatives?  
 
In order to address these questions, we collected two levels of data in 2009 which together 
amounted to 17 interviews along with documentary material and observations. The first level 
relates to the implementation of the cooperatives policy in KwaZulu-Natal province. These 
include interviews with officials at provincial level at the KwaZulu-Natal Department of 
Education (DoE), the provincial Department of Economic Development (DED), Ithala 
Development Finance Corporation (a development bank owned by provincial government), 
training colleges, and Masscash (a major wholesaler of ingredients to service providers). 
 
The second level of data is a case study of cooperatives operating in a single district in 
KwaZulu-Natal which we will refer to as the case study district. There are 12 districts in the 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education’s administrative system. Each district consists of 
about four circuits, and each circuit consists of around four wards. The district which we 
examined was in line with these averages, containing four circuits, each with one cooperative. 
Interviews were held with members of the four cooperatives operating in the case study 
district, officials from the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education at district, circuit and 
ward level, and school principals located in the case study district. In addition to interviews, 
observations of members of a cooperative were conducted whilst they were procuring and 
distributing weekly perishables. 
 
As a qualitative case study, the strength of this research is its ability to reflect some of the 
coalface issues that resulted from the decision to replace SMMEs with cooperatives, 
particularly in the case study district. The district was chosen in discussion with the 
Department of Education, because it had urban, peri-urban and rural sections. In addition, the 
cooperatives in the case study district demonstrated a variety of scenarios with regard to the 
viability of the cooperatives. While one cooperative was successful and growing, others were 
unreliable suppliers of food to schools and in some cases collapsed as businesses. We have 
therefore captured some of the variety of experiences resulting from this policy intervention. 
While we cannot assume that the experiences of cooperatives in one case study apply to all 
others, our vertical contextualisation of the difficulties experienced at the local scale within 
provincial procedures suggests that the mechanisms of implementation were at least partly 
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responsible and our study therefore has implications beyond the case study district. 
 
1. School nutrition programmes 
International and South African literature underscores the important relationship between 
nutrition and education (Gardner and Halweil, 2000; Horton, 1999; United Nations, 2007). 
While a single meal at school cannot address the multidimensional factors causing 
malnutrition, nutritional deficiencies impact on a child’s ability to learn which in turn has 
consequences on the child’s future development (Grantham-McGregor, 2005). At best, 
school nutrition programmes offer a limited response to malnutrition since most damage from 
malnutrition is done in the years before a child reaches school (Bennet, 2003; Child Health 
Unit, 1997; Lund, 2008; Shrimpton et al., 2001; World Bank, 2006). Furthermore, a single 
meal cannot address the multidimensional factors causing malnutrition, and as a result of 
extreme poverty the provision of a school meal may replace a higher nutritional meal 
received at home (Child Health Unit, 1997). Yet, positive interventions are still possible at 
primary school by addressing micronutrient deficiencies, for example (Bennet, 2003; Del 
Rosso, 1999; Del Rosso and Marek, 1996). 
 
The most important impact of school feeding programmes is arguably on education 
outcomes. School meals alleviate the short term hunger that undermines children’s ability to 
concentrate and perform complex tasks (Del Rosso, 1999; Grantham-McGregor et al., 1998; 
FRAC, 2008). Feeding programmes can also improve school performance as a result of 
behaviour, cognitive ability and improved nutritional status (Bennet, 2003; Grantham-
McGregor, 2005; WFP, 2004). They can improve time in school through increased 
enrolment, attendance and punctuality.  
 
The National School Nutritional Programme (NSNP) in South Africa was established to 
‘contribute to the improvement in education quality by enhancing primary school pupils’ 
learning capacity, school attendance and punctuality and contribute to general health 
improvement by alleviating hunger’ (SA Ministry in the Office of the Presidency, 1994:46). 
When the scheme was introduced, it was initially managed by the National Department of 
Health under the programme name of the Primary School Nutritional Programme (PSNP). In 
2004 the management of the programme was transferred to the National Department of 
Education and was renamed the NSNP. This institutional shift reflects a broader tension: 
whether feeding schemes address health or educational objectives (Kallmann, 2005). Around 
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six million primary school children throughout South Africa are fed each school day 
(National Treasury, 2008). Of all the provinces, the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education 
(KZN DOE) feeds the most children and has the largest allocation of funding from National 
Treasury. In the 2008-2009 financial year, more than 1.4 million primary school children in 
3812 schools in KwaZulu-Natal were targeted for school feeding (DOE, 2008).  
 
According to reviews of the PSNP and NSNP in South Africa the programme is limited both 
by design and implementation (Kallmann, 2005; Wildeman and Mbebetho, 2005; Monson 
and Hall, 2006; Poswell and Leibbrandt, 2006; Fumbar, 2007; National Treasury, 2008). In 
terms of design, the programme only offers one meal a day for specific schools covering 
certain age groups, and therefore excludes many hungry children (Kallmann, 2005). 
Regarding implementation there were many reports of administrative problems (Kallmann, 
2005; Fumbar, 2007) and inadequate budgeting (Wildeman and Mbebetho, 2005; National 
Treasury, 2008). As a result many eligible children were not receiving meals as they should 
(Monson and Hall, 2006). Within the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal, 25% of schools within 
the target quintiles one to three were not receiving meals (Poswell and Leibbrandt, 2006).  
 
The reviews also indicated that there is divergent implementation of the programme. Under 
both the Department of Health and Department of Education, operational responsibility was 
devolved to provincial government which formulated their own strategies for targeting 
vulnerable primary schools (Kallmann, 2005; National Treasury, 2008). Fundamental 
differences include grades and individuals targeted, the targeting method, the number of days 
children are fed, procurement processes, number and nature of service provider, and 
supplementary funding. There is little research on the most efficient and effective model of 
service provision or the viability of including economic development as one of the objectives 
of the NSNP.  
 
2. Cooperatives: the silver bullet?  
Cooperatives have been presented as a panacea for many development challenges (Attwood 
and Baviskar, 1988; Braverman et al., 1991; COPAC, 2008; ICA & ILO, 2005; Philip, 2003). 
According to the International Cooperative Alliance, Cooperatives are defined as ‘An 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet the common economic, social 
and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically controlled 
enterprise’ (ICA 1995, no page. This wording was also used by the DTI 2004:7). The special 
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properties of cooperatives enable economies of scale, pooling of capital, greater leverage and 
the sharing of knowledge (US Overseas Cooperative Development Council, 2007). 
Cooperatives are also said to enable higher-risk, higher-return activities than would be 
possible in single owner enterprises (Birchall, 2003). Beyond these economic benefits, the 
democratic principles and values of cooperatives facilitate empowerment because members 
have control over the resources being invested and the decision-making process (Birchall, 
2003:20).  
 
In South Africa, sustained high levels of unemployment led the government to consider 
cooperatives as a way of fostering economic and social development. This was signalled in 
the 2003 Presidential Growth and Development Summit, which endorsed special measures 
for the promotion of cooperatives (NEDLAC, 2003). Charged with developing a cooperatives 
strategy, the Department of Trade and Industry produced A co-operative development policy 
for South Africa (DTI, 2004), which in turn resulted in the 2005 Cooperative Act. This policy 
emphasis has greatly boosted the number of registered cooperatives. According to Mphalwa 
(2008) there were 12 188 new cooperatives registered nationally in the period 2005 to 2007, 
which in total is three times the number of cooperatives that were registered in the preceding 
82 years.  
 
The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government has played a leading role in the promotion of 
cooperatives, with 40 percent of the total 17 000 registered cooperatives being located in the 
province (Mphalwa, 2008). The growth in the number of cooperatives in KwaZulu-Natal has 
been achieved as a result of the provincial government’s aggressive promotion of 
cooperatives within the new national emphasis (Manzi, 2008). According to the provincial 
Minister of Finance and Economic Development:  
The provincial Cabinet has committed to a procurement spend of 10% for 
cooperatives, and this will be monitored closely and reported on a quarterly basis. It 
will be expected that heads of departments through their heads of supply chain 
management units will meet these targets and this should form part of the terms of 
their performance agreements for 2008/09. (Mkhize, 2008) 
 
When asked why cooperatives were promoted as a model an official from an official from the 
provincial Department of Economic Development replied: ‘Co-operatives address more 
people than SMMEs as they can benefit more than one person. It is a more inclusive form of 
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development’ (Interview KZN DED official A). 
 
Yet the mere creation of cooperatives cannot alone be taken as an indication of success 
(Braverman et al., 1991), and commentators have noted that there is little clarity on how 
many of these are successful enterprises (Theron, 2008). Satgar argues that many 
cooperatives ‘have paper membership and are dysfunctional’ (2007:10). Within KwaZulu-
Natal, the focus on registering as many cooperatives as possible was described by one official 
as ‘rush hour with many mistakes being made’ (Interview KZN DED official A). A 
representative from Ithala echoed this sentiment:  
There has been a huge rush to register as many [cooperatives] as possible. There was 
no proper strategy. The strategy flew before it could even crawl. There was a boom 
without the systems. (Interview Ithala official) 
 
She estimated that, 93 % of the 1200 cooperatives funded by Ithala were in default by early 
2009 (Interview Ithala official). 
 
According to both international and South African experience, there are a number of inter-
related factors which might challenge the viability of cooperatives. First, the role of 
government in setting up cooperatives frequently makes cooperatives dependent from the 
outset (Braverman et al., 1991). Governments and other agencies create cooperatives through 
the top-down imposition of blueprints. Rather than allowing cooperatives to emerge 
organically at grassroots level, such schemes assume members can simply be educated to 
adopt and implement the blueprint (Hyden, 1988; COPAC, 2008). However this results in 
inflexibility and a disregard for existing enterprises. In addition, government-created 
cooperatives tend not to achieve the autonomous and voluntary spirit often expected of this 
form of enterprise.  
 
Second, the cooperative form itself gives rise to tensions between democratic worker 
decision-making and business efficiency, between members’ roles as workers and owners, 
and between the short-term desire of members to derive income and the longer-term interest 
of the economic entity (Philip, 2003). Third, the skills required for successfully running an 
enterprise are often lacking amongst those targeted for participation (Philip, 2003). Fourth, 
cooperatives as development projects are often expected to operate in adverse economic 
conditions where the populace is poor and where private entrepreneurs either have failed or 
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are unwilling to invest resources (Braverman et al., 1991). Confronted with these various 
internal and external challenges, full membership participation is often difficult to achieve 
(DGRV, 2007; Braverman et al., 1991) and cooperatives struggle to attain sustainability.  
 
3. Cooperatives in the KwaZulu-Natal school nutrition programme 
The income-generating potential of the school nutrition programme for local people 
supplying food was, from the outset, seen as an important aspect of its value as a 
development intervention (Lund 2008). There is a division of labour between those who 
prepare meals in schools and service providers, who provide the ingredients to schools. Meal 
preparers work at a single school only and are appointed by the governing body of that 
school. Service providers – who are the focus of this article – are responsible for procuring 
and delivering ingredients and cooking fuel to schools. Generally dry goods are delivered 
once a month and perishables weekly. Service providers also pay the meal preparers at each 
school. Since the start of the nutrition programme in the 1990s, service providers have 
generally taken the form of SMMEs, and 1100 of these continue to operate in the provincial 
programme. They are awarded contracts primarily on the basis of price with other factors 
being considered including quality of supply, previous experience and black ownership. 
SMMEs are variable in form, with some supplying a single school and others supplying a 
number of schools. SMMEs often have diversified business interests other than the feeding 
scheme. 
 
From July 2006 SMMEs supplying some schools were replaced by purpose built 
cooperatives. Together, the 42 new cooperatives were to supply 17 % of the programme’s 
target children. Those schools not selected to be supplied by a new cooperative would 
continue to be serviced by the existing SMME infrastructure. Various role players 
interviewed named the provincial Member of Executive Council for Education (MEC) as the 
main driver of the introduction of cooperatives (Interview KZN DOE official B; KZN DOE 
official E; training college official A; KZN DOE official G). The MEC’s approach, of course, 
should be located within the context of the provincial drive to spend at least 10% of the 
supplier budget on cooperatives, which, in turn, follows the national prioritisation of 
cooperatives. For its part, the provincial Department of Education identified the school 
nutrition programme as the most appropriate way of promoting cooperatives (DOE, 2008:19). 
The new cooperatives were created in a top-down fashion with a number of parameters 
stipulated by provincial government flowing from the recommendations of a provincial 
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NSNP team. In contrast to SMMEs, cooperatives did not have to compete on price and were 
guaranteed a set payment per meal per child. A provincial Department of Education 
spokesperson explained that: 
As the decision to use cooperatives is a political decision, they will continue to fall 
outside the quotation system. If [they were] part of the quotation system, chances are 
that the cooperatives would not be selected (Interview KZN DOE official B). 
 
It was decided that there should be one cooperative for each of the circuits in the province 
(approximately four per district). Schools to be supplied by a circuit’s cooperative were 
distributed evenly between the four or so wards that made up that circuit. There were no 
major criteria for schools being selected, other than that together the schools had to make up 
5000 learners. Principals had no input as to whether their schools would be supplied by 
cooperatives. One principal explained that he was notified without any warning or input from 
himself that his current SMME was to be replaced by a cooperative, even though the SMME 
was a black woman from the local area who was doing an excellent job as a service provider 
(Interview school principal A). 
 
The performance of the four cooperatives in the case study district examined for this study 
has been mixed. By early 2009, only one cooperative was still supplying all the schools that it 
was originally assigned, and indeed the number of schools supplied by this cooperative has 
been increased. A principal of a school supplied by this cooperative was positive about 
service received. However, two of the other cooperatives are barely functioning and are 
providing food to a greatly reduced number of children. The fourth cooperative has been 
suspended and is not supplying food. Some of the schools no longer supplied by the non-
performing cooperative have been transferred to the successful cooperative. The balance of 
the schools has been allocated to SMMEs. 
 
Some school principals have said that service from the poorly functioning cooperatives is 
unreliable: 
My dealings with the cooperative are very frustrating. Firstly, kids are not being fed 
on certain days. This is particularly bad at the start of the school year and school 
terms and has a major negative impact on kids. We often have to do internal 
collections to make sure the kids get a meal. Secondly, I have to play an active role in 
doing the administration for the cooperative, as they have no idea. If I did not they 
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would not get paid and the children would not get fed (Interview school principal C). 
 
Another principal interviewed describes similar experiences with a cooperative: 
The service levels were very poor. Often children would not get fed. Sometimes it 
was their only meal a day so it was disastrous for these children not to be fed. I often 
had to phone members of the cooperative when they failed to deliver food but they 
would either switch off their cell phones or not answer them. I never knew who the 
responsible person was as different members would arrive all the time (Interview 
school principal A). 
 
The discussion now turns to an examination of the difficulties reported in relation to the 
cooperatives under the topics of viability, membership and skills. 
 
4. Implementation difficulties 
4.1 Viability 
Cooperative members had few personal assets and little in the way of a business record of 
accomplishment with which to raise their own finance. Anticipating this, the provincial 
Department of Economic Development secured financing for all of the cooperatives through 
Ithala. Rather than the cooperatives submitting individual applications for finance, all 
applications were approved by Ithala en masse. A total facility of R 300 000 was made 
available to each cooperative of which R 280 000 was a loan and had to be repaid within a 
year. The balance of R 20 000 was free funding provided by the provincial Department of 
Economic Development. Once the Ithala loan had been drawn down and loan repayments had 
commenced, access to financial support effectively ended. Opportunities to buy on credit 
were minimal. A Massmart representative stated that ‘credit will not be given to cooperatives, 
but only to individual members who have financial muscle’ (Interview Massmart official). 
 
Of all the 42 loans granted across the province as part of the schools feeding scheme, 12 
cooperatives as at February 2009 were in default with Ithala with total arrears exceeding R 
1.5 million (Interview Ithala official). Even though personal sureties have been received from 
individual members, Ithala did not intend to enforce them. The only follow up action taken 
by Ithala was telephone calls to the members requesting payment. Given this soft approach, it 
is not surprising that  
cooperatives are seen by many as a grant programme – join a cooperative and get 
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money. The understanding of the people is that the money is government money and 
does not have to be paid back (Interview Ithala official). 
 
Similarly, a training college official cynically stated that ‘if you want to receive money from 
the government with no come backs, form a cooperative’ (Interview training college official 
A).  
 
Tangible benefits are, of course, essential for those participating (DGRV 2007). Yet no 
modelling was done by the provincial Department of Education on the costs and revenues 
that could be expected by cooperatives. Furthermore, payment adjustments did not match 
inflation. The amount per learner per meal was kept constant for several years and when it 
was increased it did not match the increase of the service providers’ costs. Compounding this 
problem, late payments often occurred as a result of bureaucratic delays or the incorrect 
completion of forms by the cooperatives. Arrangements with Ithala were described as being 
extremely complicated and in many instances were not understood by many in the provincial 
Department of Education, let alone cooperative members. With cash flow a critical factor, the 
late payment of claims has enormous implications for the day-to-day survival of the 
cooperatives and for their capacity to procure food to feed learners.  
 
SMMEs selected the schools they wish to supply based on their own sense of the viability of 
doing so. Cooperatives, however, had no input into which and how many schools they would 
supply. There was no economic rationale given for the requirement that each cooperative 
serve 5000 learners drawn equally from the various wards within each circuit (Interview 
KZN DOE official A). Enrolment figures varied between schools, resulting in variations in 
the number of schools supplied by each cooperative. This is apparent in the case study district 
where one cooperative had to supply 14 schools with a total enrolment of 5336 learners in 
contrast to another cooperative which enjoyed economies of scale from servicing just six 
schools with a total enrolment of 5085 learners. Furthermore, the requirement that schools 
had to be drawn from each of the wards in a circuit meant that cooperatives had to service 
wide geographical areas. Cooperatives were prevented from using their funding for 
purchasing vehicles and therefore had to hire vehicles to undertake their deliveries. Not only 
did this effect costs, but service levels are also affected as control was handed to third party 
transporters. According to a principal, cooperative members also had to use public transport 





The instructions from the provincial NSNP team were that there were to be ten members per 
cooperative in order to exceed the five members required by the Cooperative Act. The 
cooperatives were not based on pre-existing groups and were created specifically for the 
purpose of this programme. Once schools were identified within a circuit, individual 
cooperative members were selected from the parent body of those schools. Individuals had to 
be black, female, and from a poor economic background. Names of individuals meeting the 
criteria were put forwarded by the principals or school governing bodies after a process of 
election, nomination or name drawing, with the final selection of individuals vested in the 
ward managers.  
 
The expectation that ten cooperative members could jointly build up an enterprise on the 
basis of equality and mutuality did not translate easily into practise. In many of the interviews 
words such as ‘conflict’, ‘tension’, ‘mistrust’, and ‘suspicion’ featured prominently (e.g. 
Interview KZN DOE official D; member of cooperative B; school principal B). One of the 
key reasons given for this was that members received equal remuneration regardless of work 
undertaken, resulting in resentment by those who worked harder (Interview member of 
cooperative A). An Ithala official suggested that members want to be bosses rather than 
workers and some members were reluctant to take on difficult or menial work (Interview 
Ithala official). Friction also arose around how much members should pay themselves versus 
preserving funds for future requirements and business development (Interview member of 
cooperative A).  
 
While the literature discussion above suggests that cooperatives are prone to these kinds of 
difficulties as a result of their design (Philip, 2003), the process stipulated for selecting 
members further compounded these conflicts. Some members ‘met for the first time at their 
initial training session’ (Interview training college official B). After the cooperative was 
formed, members were not allowed to recruit new members or cancel the membership of an 
existing member. Furthermore, the membership was distributed throughout a circuit since 
members had to come from each of the wards in the circuit. This made regular 
communication and meetings not only costly but also time consuming and difficult to 





4.3 Skills  
The provincial Department of Economic Development arranged training through Further 
Education and Training Colleges. Training took place over a two-month period and it was 
compulsory for all members. The cost of the training was free for the members, with the 
colleges receiving compensation from the provincial Department of Economic Development. 
Level of education and previous business experiences not specified as criteria for 
membership of cooperatives. As a result, some members had limited formal education and 
limited business experience. Indeed the essential foundations were lacking for some, and a 
college official expressed concern that training was extremely difficult because many 
cooperative members ‘could not read or write’ (Interview training college official B). Once 
the training was over, support consisted of half a year of limited mentorship from training 
colleges, after which they were cut loose. The provincial Departments of Education and 
Economic Development had little capacity with which to offer support for cooperatives and 
cooperatives reported that they felt that they had no support structures to call upon.  
 
Demanding skills were required of cooperative members. Firstly, they had to manage their 
major costs of procurement and redistribution. With many members having no previous 
business experience, concerns were raised about the ability of members to do so. One 
respondent claimed that the cooperatives were getting ‘ripped off’ by suppliers. Secondly, 
cooperative members had to manage cash flow and to ensure that there was enough cash in 
the short, medium and long term. Some members had never had a bank account before. A 
cooperative feeding 5000 children for 20 days a month gives a total monthly outlay of R 130 
000. Since payments from the provincial Department of Education being done in arrears, two 
months of working capital would be required totalling R 260 000, leaving little left over from 
the start up funding of R300 000. Tardy submission of claim forms resulted in significant 
cash flow problems in these circumstances. 
 
Thirdly, according to statutory and legal frameworks, a cooperative is a legal entity and is 
required to meet certain obligations. These include the preparation and submission of annual 
financial statements and the registration and submission of various tax returns. There was 
little indication that the cooperatives were meeting these obligations. Whist one cooperative 
had prepared quarterly reports of inflows and outflows, no annual financial statements had 
been prepared or submitted. Another cooperative had failed to keep any records and as a 
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result financial accounts could not be prepared.  
 
Of the four cooperatives within the case study, the only cooperative that had met its 
obligations as a service provider was managed by a woman with acumen and extensive 
previous business skills. In explaining the failure of other cooperatives, she lambasted the 
lack of skills and stated ‘a blind person cannot lead a blind somebody’ (Interview member of 
cooperative A).  
 
5. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion we will now address each of the five questions we set out in the 
introduction. Firstly, school feeding schemes have multiple development objectives including 
meeting some nutritional deficiencies of children and enabling their fuller participation in the 
development process. The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government has added a further 
objective which was to harness the multiplier effects of the delivery system to create more 
income opportunities for marginalised women through cooperatives. This raises the crucial 
issue, which we cannot resolve here, of whether or not this development instrument can 
accommodate these various objectives and how some prioritisation amongst them might be 
resolved. If income opportunities are deemed a tertiary objective, for example, what should 
the policy response be when attempts to achieve the tertiary objective undermine the primary 
objectives? 
 
Secondly, policy makers favour cooperatives because they are thought to extend income 
opportunities to more people. Yet cooperatives command something of a blind faith as a 
solution to unemployment. Many of the problems encountered in this intervention were well 
documented of other cooperative interventions. These include problems related to uneven 
membership participation (DGRV, 2007; Braverman et al., 1991), the lack of skills necessary 
skills (Philip, 2003), and the way in which the volunteerism that is meant to define 
cooperatives is suffocated by inflexible top down creation (Hyden, 1988; COPAC, 2008). 
Despite considerable effort being made to address skills deficits, the need for capital, and so 
on, some cooperatives failed.  
 
Third, cooperatives were implemented in the KwaZulu-Natal school nutrition programme in 
order to meet a quota. The result was that some viable SMMEs were squeezed out in the 
process and only some cooperatives were successful. Some school children were not 
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provided with meals as a result. Fourth, the reasons for some cooperatives failing included 
problems related to viability, membership and skills, many of which in turn reflect on the 
design and implementation of the policy.  
 
Fifth, it is possible to imagine an alternative approach to that attempted in this case study. 
This does not constitute a set of recommendations since it has not been tested, but offers 
some speculation on a different way of creating cooperatives. Applications by aspirant 
cooperatives should be individually assessed on merit rather than approved automatically as a 
result of political imperatives. Cooperatives should be given much more control over their 
own membership size and composition, and should have control over admitting potentially 
useful additional members and to excluding non-contributing members. Cooperatives should 
be able control how many schools they supply and where they are located. Cooperatives 
should not be decreed into being according to arbitrary membership sizes, membership 
compositions, schools and turnovers. More substantial support for cooperatives after their 
implementation might assist them to take root and establish sustainable practices. Finally, 
cooperatives should not receive normative priority over existing enterprises which might not 
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